”
China and Pakistan have had a close-knit and mutually beneficial partnership since they established diplomatic relations in 1951. Pakistan was among the first nations to recognize the People’s Republic of China in 1950, and during Beijing’s isolation from the world in the late 1960s and early 1970s, Pakistan remained a dependable friend. China has long been a major source of military, economic, and technological support for Pakistan, particularly the transfer of equipment and sensitive nuclear technologies. According to some observers, Pakistan will eventually push for even deeper ties with China, its longstanding strategic security partner, because of the United States developing stronger links with Delhi. Others claim Beijing may be moving more cautiously along with the relationship because of its growing concerns over rebel groups based in Pakistan.
Even so, it maintains the belief that since 1951, its foreign policy has been centred on its bilateral relations with China. However, it also desires cordial connections with America and has been worried that the rivalry between the US and China may limit its contacts with either nation.
Pakistan’s worries might be allayed by the positive result of the Biden-Xi discussion that took place outside of the most recent Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) conference in San Francisco. Although Beijing’s economic growth and the US economy both benefit from China’s military and technological advancements, Washington seems more interested in keeping Beijing in check.
Pakistan will eventually push for even deeper ties with China, its longstanding strategic security partner, because of the United States developing stronger links with Delhi.
Geopolitics is also becoming more open to competition. Many nations are siding with both the US along China as they fight to reshape the world to fit their worldviews to maximize their worldwide involvement advance their interests and ensure that any future global framework would suit them. One illustration of this “multi-vector” foreign policy is the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India and China) alliance. However, Pakistan lacks the ability and strategy to make use of the possibilities. Its interactions with China as well as the US arouse mixed feelings in the public: a positive perception of the US and a romanticized image of relations with China.
However, officials believe Pakistan needs to maintain a productive connection with the US, as it is the country’s top export market, a significant foreign shareholder, a lifeline for its IMF-dependent economy, and a vital stakeholder in the stability of South Asia. They are also aware of the possibility of Pakistan turning into unduly dependent on China. However, widespread misgivings about the US still exist. True, there is a high price to be paid for the advantages of having links with the US. The US hampered Pakistan’s political process by endorsing the security-dominated, elitist-led, deeply ingrained ideological, as well as externally dependent outlook on the nation.
Pakistan became more unstable and extremist because of its wars. However, the public must realize that Pakistan’s government, which sided with Washington, was also a part of US policy and needs to take responsibility for it. Other misconceptions exist. Because of the well-known aid link, Pakistan’s leaders, the strategic community, and the public all held the view for decades that Pakistan-US ties were essential to US policy in South Asia. They are now miffed that the US “switched” to Delhi and abandoned an ally. Substantial US aid did not equate to a meaningful relationship. Furthermore, the alliance’s commitment was vague and limited. Additionally, the US lacked a South Asia policy.
However, the US discovered that Pakistan’s services were useful in occasionally addressing certain irregular geopolitical and security difficulties. For this reason, it did not find any conflict between its ties to Pakistan and its backing of Delhi’s non-alignment after the Sino-Indian War of 1962.
America did not begin to see specific long-term strategic, economic, and safety concerns in South Asia unless the rise of China, the beginning of globalization, the development of computer technology, and the rise of religious extremism. It desired Pakistan’s assistance in countering security concerns and aimed to limit Chinese dominance in the region and beyond with its relationship with New Delhi.
Since then, trade disputes, COVID-19, supply chain problems, and worries over national security have made Great Power rivalry geopolitics, and local politics more complicated. There are currently attempts underway to re-globalize, as defined by geopolitics, following the US’s unsuccessful attempt to de-globalize.
They are characterized by emerging middle powers’ aspirations to forge a multipolar world beyond geopolitical divides, as well as China’s growing economic importance, which has encouraged the US to increase its worldwide economic influence. The line separating geopolitics and geoeconomics has become less apparent as a result. And developing India is at a fork in the path. Its boundary dispute with Beijing and geostrategic location along the Indian Ocean make it an ideal geopolitical ally for the United States, while its potential for economic growth and technical advancements makes it a desirable geoeconomic partner. The US believes Delhi can assist in addressing its scarcity of “scientists, technologists, and engineers” and wants to speed up the development of AI. Thus, US relations with Islamabad and New Delhi cannot be compared. Washington still values Islamabad, but it will not be defined by its historical relationships. The nation will need to rethink the significance of US policies in South Asia by emphasizing its shared security and economic interests. Despite its relevance, geopolitics will not propel the partnership.
In summary, although not flawless, ties within the US are nonetheless essential. Pakistan’s demands cannot be met by its ties with Beijing, but they are even so needed.
The writer is a freelance columnist.
”
